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Abstract
To what degree is voter confidence in election procedures driven by satisfaction with the 
outcome of an election, as opposed to trust in government or objective features of the polling 
place, such as voting technology?  Using approximately 30 national surveys over the past 
decade, we find a consistent relationship between voting for the winner and confidence in 
election administration.  This confidence varies as a function of question wording and electoral 
context.  Respondents are more confident in the quality of the vote count locally than nationally.  
They are responsive to electoral results at the state and national levels in forming their 
judgements.  And, rather than being influenced by different types of voting technology, 
respondents lose confidence by virtue of change itself.
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2To what degree does the practical experience of participating in an election — registering, 
casting a ballot, and watching the election returns — influence citizens' evaluations about the 
trustworthiness and fairness of election procedures?  This question has lurked around the issues 
of election administration in the years following the 2000 presidential election.  Indeed, some of 
the most prominent policy proposals and judicial pronouncements in the domain of election 
administration have been justified by reference to improving citizen confidence in the fairness of 
the vote. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Crawford v Marion County, 553 U.S. 181 
(2008), ruled that Indiana’s interest in assuring the public of the integrity of the election process 
partially justified the passage of a photo identification requirement in order to vote.1
As the improvement of voter confidence has been promoted as a goal of election reform, 
and as scholars have begun probing voter confidence through survey research, questions have 
arisen about whether expressions of confidence in these surveys are a product of voters’ direct 
experience of voting, or whether they are a product of something else, such as the causally prior 
belief about the trustworthiness of government more generally.  More troubling for democracy, 
there is also the possibility that expressions of confidence in how ballots are counted are no more
than reflections of whether one’s preferred candidate won or lost the election: if my preferred 
candidate won, then I think the election was conducted fairly. To the extent this is true, it not 
only calls into question the usefulness of confidence questions for guiding policy makers, but it 
also suggests that contentious disputes over election outcomes will be inescapable in an 
increasingly polarized society, no matter what administrative reforms are put in place.
1 Gronke and Hicks (2009) contains a comprehensive review of recent studies that examine voter confidence 
as a dependent variable, as well as a summary of recent policy debates that center around the concept of voter 
confidence.
3Our purpose in this paper is to explore this last possibility, by combining data from a 
number of survey research projects.  Specifically, we focus on asking: to what degree is voter 
confidence driven by a respondent’s satisfaction with the outcome of an election, as opposed to 
more general trust in government or objective features of the polling place, such as voting 
technology? While all the data will be observational, we are able to exploit several features of the
data that help support a causal interpretation of our results, such as the dynamic nature of the 
data and the unpredictability of certain election results. 
We find there is indeed a consistent relationship between voting for the winning candidate
and the degree of confidence expressed in election administration. However, this relationship 
varies as a function of both the question wording and the electoral context. At the aggregate 
level, Democrats began the 2000s less confident than Republicans; but with Democratic victories
in the 2006 and 2008 elections, the partisan gap narrowed considerably, then flipped in the wake 
of Barack Obama's re-election in 2012. 
At the state level, confidence in local election administration varies predictably as a 
function of the vote share received by the respondent's favored candidate. Turning to the 
individual level results, we find the relationship between vote choice and confidence is 
unchanged when adjusting for general political trust or pre-election confidence. Finally, we show
that the relationship is also robust to the inclusion of the type of voting technology used in the 
respondent's county. In so doing, we also show that specific technologies in themselves have less
of an effect on confidence than changes in technology. In other words, voters seem to be more 
confident when the type of ballot technology used in their county remains the same from election
to election, regardless of what that technology happens to be.
4The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section I, we review the previous 
political science literature that takes on the issue of voter confidence.  In Section II, we set the 
stage by exploring the aggregate results of approximately thirty national surveys taken between 
2000 and 2012 that ask about confidence in the vote count nationally and confidence in one's 
own vote. We examine both aggregate trends and movements in partisan subgroups, showing that
Democratic and Republican confidence both move as a function of the parties’ electoral fortunes.
We also demonstrate that the results of national elections have a greater influence on voters’ 
confidence  in the nation's vote than in their own personal vote.  In Section III, we move to the 
state level and show that a party's vote share in a state influences the partisans' confidence in the 
fairness of vote counting in their own state. 
Section IV moves to the micro-level, exploring the degree to which voter confidence is
influenced by more general  expressions of trust  in government,  pre-election confidence,  and
voting technology. We find that the inclusion of none of these variables as a control alters the
strong influence of partisanship on confidence in any meaningful way. Section V leverages the
panel nature of three of the surveys to estimate the effect of election outcomes on post-election
confidence,  controlling  for  confidence  prior  to  the  election.  Section  VI  concludes  by
summarizing the findings from the paper and suggesting future directions for research.
I.  Previous Literature
This paper contributes to two literatures under the broader heading of “political legitimacy.” The 
first is the literature on voter confidence in election administration, which was largely spawned 
by the aftermath of the 2000 election. As with most studies in this literature, the question we 
5focus on is generally asked in post-election surveys as follows:  “How confident are you that 
your vote was counted as intended?”2  The response categories tend to range from “very 
confident” to “not at all confident.”  As we will discuss below, sometimes voters are asked to 
distinguish how their own vote was counted from how votes in general were counted nationwide.
Most of the existing research on this question has asked what types of election procedures
make for more confident voters (Stewart 2009; Alvarez et al. 2008; Alvarez et al. 2009; Hall et 
al. 2009; Atkenson and Saunders 2007; Stein et al. 2008). For example, Gronke and Hicks  
(2009) show that responses to questions such as these on modules of the CCES are associated 
most strongly with the experience voters had on Election Day casting a ballot, compared to 
competing influences that include a measure for a generalized “active trust in government.”  
Thus, although voter confidence is associated with respondents’ general orientation toward 
government and policy positions, Gronke and Hicks argue it is most strongly influenced by their 
experience with specific features of the voting process, such as the quality of the interactions 
with poll workers and the overall Election Day experience.
Thus, we are not the first to look at this particular survey question.  However, we are the 
first to take advantage of the fact that this question has been asked repeatedly over the past 
decade.  We are also the first to probe more deeply the extent to which the interaction between 
partisan affiliations and election outcomes—as opposed to voters' subjective experiences at the 
polls, which may themselves be affected by party—influence confidence; our data allow us to  
rely on shifts in the electoral fortunes of the parties at the national and state levels to assess the 
degree to which party loyalties drive assessments of electoral quality.
2 Pre-election surveys typically ask a variant of the question how confident respondents are that votes will be 
counted accurately in the coming election.
6Indeed, such an interaction between party loyalty and election outcomes has been found 
on many other measures of political legitimacy, and it is to this literature on the so-called 
“winner's effect” that we also contribute.  This literature is somewhat older, dating back to at 
least Ginsberg and Weissberg's (1978) classic study. Considering the 1968 and 1972 elections in 
the U.S., Ginsberg and Weissberg detected both a “participation effect,” which resulted from 
simply participating in the election, and a “winner effect,” which resulted from having one's 
favored candidate win, on perceptions of legitimacy. Other notable works include Finkel (1985), 
who argued for a  reciprocal relationship between participation and political efficacy; Clarke and 
Acock (1989), who found this reciprocal effect was limited to participants whose preferred 
candidate won; Anderson and LoTempio (2002), who examine pre- and post-election measures 
of political trust in the 1972 and 1996 U.S. presidential elections, and find that voting for the 
winner boosts political trust; and Craig et al. (2006), who pool data from the American National 
Elections Study from 1964 and 2004, and find that losers are always less politically trusting than 
winners. The “winner's effect” on trust and legitimacy has also been observed in House elections 
(Brunell 2008), state politics (Anderson et al. 2005), and cross-nationally (Anderson et al. 2005).
II.  Macro-level Voter Confidence
We begin our analysis by studying responses to voter confidence questions asked in national 
surveys before and after each federal election from 2000 to 2012, with the exception of 2002, 
when no national survey (that we know of) asked this question.  In general, there are two ways 
that polling houses have asked about confidence in election processes.  The first is to ask about 
the belief concerning whether the respondent’s “own” vote—as opposed to votes elsewhere in 
7the country—was counted correctly. The following are representative examples of questions that 
seek to assess this level of voter confidence:
 Given the kinds of problems that have been reported in Florida, how much confidence do 
you have that your [2000 presidential] vote was counted properly? (11/12/2000, 
CBS/N.Y. Times)
 Are you confident that your vote will be counted accurately, or are you doubtful? 
(11/1/2004, National Annenberg Election Study [NAES])
 How confident are you that your vote was accurately counted? (11/8/2004, 11/12/2006, 
11/9/2008, 11/7/2010, Pew Research Center)
The second way is to ask about vote counting generally, or nationwide. The following are 
examples of questions taken from surveys conducted over the past decade that seek to assess 
voter confidence in the “country's” vote:
 All things considered, do you think we will have an accurate count of the votes in Florida
and other close states, or not? (11/12/2000, Pew Research Center)
 How confident are you that, across the country, the votes will be accurately cast and 
counted in next year’s election? (12/2/2007, Gallup/USA Today)
 How confident are you that the votes across the country were accurately counted on 
Election Day? (1/31/2009, National Annenberg Election Study)
The top panel of Figure 1 summarizes answers to these two types of questions across a 
number of different public opinion polls from 2000 to 2012.  The points in this plot are the 
8proportions of respondents who gave the “most confident” answer to the question posed.3  The 
trend lines represent moving averages constructed by median-splines.
[Figure 1 about here]
We included these particular studies based on our own knowledge of polls that have been 
taken by various organizations over the past decade, augmented by a search of the Roper Center 
database to find other polls that asked questions about vote counting and confidence.4  The 
Appendix details the sources, the precise questions asked, the sampling frames, and the survey 
modes.  The survey research organizations or projects include New York Times/CBS, the Los 
Angeles Times, ABC/Washington Post, the Pew Research Center, the National Annenberg 
Election Study, CNN, Gallup/USAToday, and the Survey of the Performance of American 
Elections.
The top pannel of Figure 1 reveals one important pattern right away: confidence in one's 
own vote has generally been about thirty percentage points higher than confidence in the 
country's vote, with the two series moving in parallel.  The second noteworthy feature of the 
series is its variability: while voters have become much less confidence in the country's vote 
since 2000, aggregate confidence in one's own vote does not seem to have changed much overall 
since the 2000 election.
To begin an exploration of the partisan dimension of confidence, the middle and bottom 
panels  of Figure 1 disaggregate the data by party identification of respondents.5  Doing so yields
3 This answer category was typically “very confident,” although in a few cases it was something else, such as 
“a lot” (CBS/N.Y. Times 11/12/2000). 
4 A search of the Roper Center iPoll database that uses the terms “voter and count* and confide*” returned 
about 30 hits, most of which are relevant to this paper. In addition to the Roper database, we also searched the Pew 
Research Center web site.
5 We rely on the initial partisanship question asked by each survey house. Thus, “leaners” are not included in 
these series.
9four patterns worth noting.  First, for both parties, confidence in one's own vote is higher than 
confidence in the country's vote.  Second, as in the plot for all voters, confidence in one's own 
vote is more stable over time. Third, until the 2008 presidential election, Republicans were more 
confident about the quality of the vote count than Democrats, both locally and nationwide.  Since
2008, both sets of partisans have been much more similar in how they judge election counts. 
Finally, by 2012 Democrats had surpassed Republicans in their confidence on both measures.
Fourth, despite the fact that the top panel of Figure 1 paints a picture of relative stability 
for aggregate confidence, the next two panels reveal that this aggregate stability hides important 
countervailing shifts among the two partisan sub-aggregates.  Across the decade, aggregate 
confidence in the country's vote declined about 30 percentage points.  However, this overall 
decline is due almost entirely to a forty-point decline among Republicans during this period.  The
biggest change occurred between 2004 and 2008, which saw a shift, from Republicans being 
more confident in the nationwide vote count, to Democrats expressing more confidence.  There 
was again a shift in partisan assessments between 2008 (with the election of a Democratic 
president) and 2010 (when the Republicans regained control of the House) that is masked if we 
only look at Figure 1.
We can begin to get a sense of the impact of election outcomes by focusing on shifts in 
the aggregate levels of confidence before and after elections. To do this, we compare the average 
confidence among winners—those who voted for the winning candidate — and losers — those 
who voted for the loser — before and after each election. For example, in the 2008 election, we 
calculate,
{E[confidencep | Obama votersp, post-electionp] - E[confidencep | Obama votersp, pre-electionp]} -
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{E[confidencep | Romney votersp, post-electionp] - E[confidencep | Romney votersp, pre-electionp]}
where p indexes polls, and post- and pre-election are defined as 365 days after or before the 
election date. We construct this estimate for the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2012 election, and 
average across elections. As we have only about 18 polls for each confidence measure, we obtain
standard errors via the block bootstrap, blocking on polling house. The resulting “quasi-
difference-in-differences” estimates are shown in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 reveals more clearly how aggregate confidence is affected by election results. In 
the top part of the figure, we see that among those who voted for the winning candidate, 
confidence in one's own vote increases by about 20 percentage points after an election. Among 
those who voted for the loser, confidence declines slightly, by about 2 percentage points. 
Subtracting the second difference from the first gives an overall effect of 0.22, with a standard 
error of 0.08. In the bottom part of the figure we see a similar, but larger effect for confidence in 
the country's vote: the estimate is 0.32, with a standard error of 0.09. Thus, just as there is more 
aggregate variability in voter confidence in the country's vote over time, this measure of 
confidence is also more affected by particular election outcomes.
III.  Voter Confidence Macro Patterns
In the previous section, we examined the relationship between national election outcomes and 
voter confidence.  We found evidence that voter confidence changes with the election returns — 
Democrats become more confident when Democrats prevail nationally.  A similar pattern holds 
for Republicans. In this section we consider the state: do partisans base their confidence on 
which presidential candidate wins their own state? To answer this question, we rely on the 2012 
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Survey of the Performance of American Elections (SPAE), which surveyed 200 voters in each 
state. We construct average levels of confidence for each party subgroup in each state, and then 
estimate how state-level confidence varies as a function of Obama's voteshare in that state. 
Specifically, we estimate the change in confidence that occurs when Obama's voteshare exceeds 
the 50% mark, using a regression discontinuity estimator. And because we are interested in the 
party differential, we estimate this jump for both party subgroups, then taking the difference in 
the two jumps as our estimate of the state-level “winner's effect.”
The SPAE fortunately asked respondents about their confidence at the state level, as well 
as at the national and personal level. Given that state voteshare is a less relevant signal about the 
conduct of elections nationally, we would expect there to be less of a jump for confidence in the 
country's vote than for one's own vote. We would also expect there to be the largest jump for 
state voteshare. Finally, given that we have now documented that confidence in the country's 
vote tends to be much lower than one's own confidence, we would expect confidence in the state 
vote to fall somewhere in between.
Figure 3 shows that all of these expectations are supported by the data. In the first panel 
on the left, we plot the average level of confidence in one's own vote, among Republicans and 
Democrats for each state, on the y-axis; Obama's voteshare is plotted on the x-axis. As expected, 
there is both a slight jump up for Democrats at the 50% mark, and a slight jump down for 
Republicans; taking the difference in these two discontinuities gives an estimate of the winner 
effect of 0.13, with a standard error of 0.05 (we calculate standard errors using the block 
bootstrap, blocking on states). In the middle plot, which describes confidence in the state vote 
count, we see much larger jumps for confidence, for an overall effect of 0.28 (0.06). In the last 
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panel, there is no detectable jump for either partisan subgroup, with an overall effect no different 
from zero (-0.02, SE=0.03). Finally, we see a clear decline in average confidence levels as we 
move further from the voter's own experience, to the state level, and then the voting around the 
country.6
[Figure 3 about here]
IV.  Voter Confidence Micro Patterns
The analysis thus far has all been at the macro level, so that we can orient ourselves to the overall
contours of the data.  However, macro analysis only gets us so far when trying to argue for 
causality, particularly if we are worried about omitted variables such as trust in government. As 
the aggregated analysis has suggested thus far, even if voter confidence is explained in part by 
general attitudes toward government, it is certainly amenable to being changed as a consequence 
of changing election outcomes.  The question for us in this section is, how much is due to general
attitudes toward government, and how much is due to following the election returns?
For each of our 28 surveys, we estimated a linear probability model, in which the 
dependent variable was the same binary voter confidence variable we explored before.7  The 
primary independent variables of interest were vote choice (1 = voted for Democratic candidate, 
0 otherwise).  We then add a battery of demographic controls, including education, income, age, 
gender, race, and state (or region if state is unavailable). All covariates are entered as indicators 
6 The SPAE is one of the few surveys with enough respondents to conduct these analyses. However, we also 
replicate them using the 2004 NAES, 2008 NAES, and 2008 SPAE surveys in the Appendix.
7 As a reminder, the dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent gave the “most confident” response to 
the voter confidence items, zero otherwise. We show the results are unchanged when using probit regressions in the 
Appendix.
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for each value of the categorical variable, except for age, which is entered linearly. Figure 4 plots
the point estimates from these regressions for each of the surveys.
[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 shows that the effect of party on confidence is strongly robust to the inclusion of
these individual-level characteristics. Indeed, the pattern is substantively the same as the simple 
bivariate comparisons included in Figure 1 previously: Democrats are between 20 and 50 
percentage points less confident than Republicans for much of the decade; the gap then narrows, 
and flips to a 20 point advantage following the 2012 election.  These effects are typically 
precisely estimated, with confidence intervals only crossing zero in one or two cases.
Next, we test whether the party effect is robust to the inclusion of trust in government 
(which we know is also effected by party and election outcomes), pre-election confidence, and 
voting technology.8 These regressions are shown in Table 1, using the smaller number of surveys 
that include one or more of these measures. In the top panel of Table 1, we show the results for 
confidence in one's own vote. Only rarely do our estimates change with the inclusion of these 
variables, and never in a consistent manner. For example, in the first two columns, adjusting for 
trust in the July 2004 CBS poll changes the winner effect from 0.19 to 0.17. Doing so in the 2004
NAES changes it from 0.23 to 0.21; adjusting for lagged confidence reduces it to 0.15 
(SE=0.04). Similarly small changes are seen in the 2012 CCES regressions (final three columns).
The exception is when we adjust for lagged confidence in the 2008 PEW survey (columns 6 and 
7). Here the effect reduces from 0.08 (SE=0.07) to 0.01 (SE=0.06). The insignificance of the 
8 Trust in government is typically measured using the question, “How much of the time do you think you can 
trust the government in Washington to do what is right -- just about always, most of the time, or only some of the 
time?” The response options were “Just about always”, “Most of the time”, and “Only some of the time”, with some 
respondents volunteering the “Never” option. We rescaled this measure to lie between 0 and 1, where higher values 
indicate greater trust in government.
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baseline effect, and the reduction when we adjust for lagged confidence, is likely due to the small
subsample for which we have two waves of data (N=288).
[Table 1 about here]
We show results for confidence in the country's vote in the bottom panel of Table 1. As 
above, we see that the inclusion of trust or lagged confidence has no effect on the estimates of 
the winner effect. For example, in the 2000 NAES, the baseline effect is 0.38 (SE=0.02), which 
changes to 0.39 (SE=0.02) when we include trust in government as a control.
Finally, we show results adjusting for voting technology in Table 2. . The top panel of 
Table 2 uses confidence in one's own vote in the 2008 SPAE (first three columns) and 2012 
SPAE (last three columns) as the outcome; the bottom panel uses confidence in the country's vote
in the 2012 SPAE as the outcome. In columns 1 and 3 of Table 2, top panel, we show the 
baseline winner effects. In columns 2 and 4, we see these baseline effects are unchanged by the 
inclusion of voting technology; the same is true when looking at confidence in the country's vote 
in the first two columns of the bottom panel.
However, the direct effects of technology are also of interest. The episode that brought 
the issue of voter confidence to the fore a decade ago was the recount controversy in Florida that 
followed the 2000 presidential election.  At the core of that episode was the malfunctioning of 
voting technologies, and the inability of the legal regime to dispassionately handle disputes that 
arose because of the failures of those technologies. If the Florida recount controversy had not 
occurred, then the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) would not have been introduced, much less 
passed.  And if HAVA had not been passed, it is unlikely that the nation would have undergone a 
wholesale program of voting machine replacement on the scale witnessed during the 2000s.
15
Reformers anticipated that HAVA and the resulting replacement of antiquated voting 
machines would reassure voters that the best of American technology was guarding the sanctity 
of the ballot box.  Unfortunately, the program of voting machine replacement that HAVA 
unleashed did quite the opposite, at least in some parts of America.  Not only did HAVA provide 
funds to upgrade voting machines with the newest models, but the law also required that 
localities provide handicapped-accessible voting machines in each precinct in America. Even 
though the law required only one accessible machine per precinct, many jurisdictions reasoned 
that it would cause confusion to administer two types of voting machines in their towns and 
counties.  Therefore, HAVA prompted many local jurisdictions to switch to direct electronic 
recording (DRE) machines for all voting, even though they could have complied with the law by 
using paper as the default technology, with DREs as the backup device for voters who required 
special accommodation.  Many of these jurisdictions had always used paper, either hand-counted
paper or paper ballots that were scanned.  This change from paper to machine led to a strong 
political reaction against DREs, and a political movement against “black box voting” 
(Ansolabehere and Stewart 2008; Harris 2004). Thus, a natural question arises about whether the 
rapid diffusion of DREs into counties that had previously used paper technologies led to a 
decline in voter confidence among voters in those localities. 
As a first cut at this question, we show raw means of confidence in Figure 6. As with 
Table 2, the top half of the figure pertains to confidence in one's own vote, and the bottom half 
displays means for confidence in the country's vote. On the x-axis, we vary voting technology 
from counties which used paper ballots (either hand counted or optically scanned) in both 2000 
16
and the current-year election, to those that used paper then switched to electronic, to those that 
switched from electronic to paper, and finally those that used electronic ballots in both years.
Figure 6 shows that in 2008, the most confident voters resided in counties that used paper
ballots in both 2000 and 2008; the next most confident groups were those that switched from 
paper to electronic, or that used electronic ballots in both years; and the least confident group 
was those who changed from electronic ballots in 2000 to paper ballots in 2008. In 2012, the 
most confident groups (whether we look at one's own vote or the country's vote) were those that 
used electronic ballots in both 2000 and 2012.
Next we test whether these patterns hold using regression specifications similar to those 
shown in Table 1. In columns 2 and 4 of the top half of Table 2, we include dummy variables for 
whether the voter’s county used DREs for in-person voting in 2000, in the current election, and 
in both elections.  Because of the presence of the interaction term, the coefficient on “DRE in 
2000” measures the direct effect of living in a county that abandoned DREs between 2000 and 
the current year, almost all of which switched to optically scanned paper ballots.  For 2008, the 
coefficient of this dummy variable is -0.12 (SE=0.05), which means that voters in counties that 
had abandoned DREs in favor of paper-based systems were much less confident their vote was 
counted as intended, compared to voters in counties that had kept their paper-based systems 
throughout the decade (the baseline category).  The dummy variable that measures the direct 
effect of having a DRE in the Current Year pertains to voters who live in counties that had 
previously not used DREs.  The coefficient of this dummy variable is -0.04 (SE=0.02), which 
means that voters in counties that had adopted DREs during the decade were also less confident 
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that their vote was counted as intended, compared to voters in counties that had kept their paper-
based voting equipment.  
Finally, the interaction term applies to voters who live in counties that used DREs 
throughout the decade.  This is the only positive coefficient in the group, 0.07, but is not 
statistically different from zero (SE=0.05); thus, voters in counties that had DREs in both 
elections were no more or less confident than those that had paper ballots throughout this period. 
In contrast, in 2012 none of these patterns are statistically different from zero, for either measure 
of confidence. This may reflect that any changes between 2000 and 2012 were already in place 
by 2008, which means that any negative effects of change have since passed.
In short, our findings are at odds with much of the activist politics of this issue during the 
past decade.  The most confident voters were those who started and ended the decade with the 
same voting technology.  The least confident voters were those who started the decade with 
DREs and then switched to paper.
V.  Voter Confidence Micro Patterns: Evidence from Panel Studies
All of the evidence adduced thus far has rested on the analysis of cross-sectional data.  We have 
inferred that individuals change their assessments of how trustworthy the vote counting is, as a 
function of changing election returns.  However, the aggregate analysis we have performed here 
is no more than correlational and suggestive of what the actual causal effects might be.  In other 
words, aggregate analysis does not establish that the individuals we would expect to change, that 
is, supporters of the winning and losing candidates, actually change their impressions of election 
administration in predictable ways, once they are apprised of the results of an election.
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Fortunately, three of the studies we gathered are panels that allow us to examine the voter
confidence levels of individuals across time, as we move from the campaign period into the post-
election period.  These three studies were the 2004 NAES, the 2008 Pew survey, and the 2008 
NAES. For each study, we conduct a difference-in-difference analysis similar to that presented in
Figure 2 previously, but now at the individual level. Thus we estimate,
{E[confidencei | winner, post-electioni] - E[confidencei | losersi, pre-electioni]} -
{E[confidencei | winner, post-electioni] - E[confidencei |losers votersp, pre-electioni]}
separately for each survey, where i indexes individual respondents. We cluster standard errors by 
survey respondent. Figure 5 presents the analysis graphically.
[Figure 5 about here]
In two of the three elections, we see patterns that reflect the results shown earlier, 
including aggregate difference-in-difference analysis presented in Figure 2. The exception is the 
first panel, which shows results for the 2004 election. In this election, both winners and losers 
became more confident in their own vote once the election was over; however, the gain in 
confidence was actually smaller among those who chose the winner, for an overall effect of -0.05
(SE=0.04). This may be due to a ceiling effect: in 2004, Republicans (whose candidate won) 
were already about 85% likely to be very confident in the accuracy of the election, and thus did 
not have a lot of room to increase. In the 2008 and 2012 elections, in contrast, we see effects of 
0.15 (SE=0.04) and 0.11 (SE=0.05), respectively, for confidence in one's own vote; and 0.47 
(0.01) and 0.15 (0.04) for confidence in the country's vote. Thus, even looking within the same 
respondents before and after an election, we see the powerful impact that an election outcome 
has on perceptions of the fairness of the vote count.
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VII.  Discussion and Conclusion
We have cast our net widely in this paper, to capture general findings that emerge from over a 
decade of public opinion research into voter confidence.  We show that respondents generally 
express greater confidence in the quality of the vote count that is undertaken locally, rather than 
nationally.  Changes in national confidence are influenced by changing fortunes of presidential 
and congressional candidates in the national elections; changes in confidence in one's own vote 
are also influenced by national partisan control, but less so. These findings are robust in the face 
of controlling for a variety of alternative explanations, including more general attitudes about 
trust in government and changes in voting technology.
One purpose of any exploratory paper is to generate new speculations about the 
relationships among variables and to chart out new lines of research.  In that spirit, we offer four 
comments as a way of concluding.
First, one of the reasons we are interested in the question of voter confidence is that 
responses to this survey item may potentially be used by policymakers and courts to judge the 
efficacy of particular election practices and reforms.  Our findings suggest that confidence in the 
country's vote seems to be more responsive to partisan feelings than confidence in one's own 
vote.  This suggests that the latter question may provide superior measures that are relevant in 
this policy setting than the former. Confidence in one's own vote appears less contaminated by 
partisanship than confidence in the country's vote.
Second, to the extent that confidence in the national vote varies more across time — and 
in response to changing election outcomes — it is consistent with a story wherein the less 
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information voters have about a government service, the more likely they are to use partisan cues
to form an opinion about that service.  Thus, since voters know more about the process behind 
“their own” vote, this question is less prone to partisan bias.  This supposition is at least testable. 
For instance, one could conduct public opinion research in which voters are experimentally 
exposed to information about electoral administration institutions and practices nationwide, to 
probe the degree to which information about election administration practices drives out partisan 
judgments.
Third, our findings concerning the role of voting technology suggest some interesting 
interactions between election reform and voter confidence (Ansolabehere and Persily 2008).  
Those findings suggest that change in election procedures, rather than their substance, decreases 
confidence in electoral practices.  Another electoral practice that comes to mind worthy of 
investigating is voter identification, which has been justified precisely on voter confidence 
grounds.  Our findings here suggest that states which have recently adopted more stringent voter 
identification requirements may experience a drop in voter confidence afterwards, and not only 
among opponents of the requirement.  In any event, this is an empirical proposition that we are 
now able to test after the 2012 presidential election.
Finally, although we do not want to claim that voter confidence can be completely 
explained by party, the fact that there is a substantial and robust partisan component to 
confidence should give reformers and others who judge the efficacy of reform some pause, if 
“boosting confidence” is the goal of election reform.  At the very least, tests of whether election 
reforms do in fact boost confidence must be conducted controlling for changing election results.  
Failure to do so risks significant omitted variables bias in judging the effects of reforms — an 
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effect so strong that we could imagine it masking even the direction of the sign of a coefficient 
that measures the effect of reform on voter confidence.
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Figure 1: Voter confidence in the accuracy of the vote count, 2000-2012.
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Notes: Each point represents an individual poll. Trend lines are calculated using median-spline
regressions.
Figure 2: Effect of election outcomes on national-level confidence: quasi-difference-in-differences
estimates.
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Notes: Plot combines data from surveys around the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2012 elections, in
a 365-day window around each election. Estimates are difference-in-differences, with standard
errors in parentheses calculated via block bootstrap (blocking on survey house). There are 21 polls
for confidence in own vote, and 16 polls for confidence in the country’s vote.
Figure 3: Effect of election outcomes on voter confidence in the 2012 CCES: regression discontinuity estimates.
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Notes: Effects are calculated as the difference in regression discontinuity estimates for Democratic and Republican voters, using 2012
Democratic voteshare as the forcing variable. Standard errors calculated using block bootstrap, blocking on states.
Figure 4: Effect of election outcomes on individual-level confidence: regression estimates.
cbsnyt 12nov2000
pew 12nov2000
latimes 16dec2000
naes 19jan2001
cbsnyt 15jul2004
pew 19oct2004
abcwp 26oct2004
cbsnyt 30oct2004
naes 01nov2004
pew 08nov2004
abcwp 19dec2004
naes 24dec2004
pew 04oct2006
cnn 15oct2006
gallupusatoday 22oct2006
abcwp 04nov2006
pew 04nov2006
pew 12nov2006
gallupusatoday 02dec2007
naes 01jan2008
pew 19oct2008
cbsnyt 29oct2008
pew 09nov2008
spae 11nov2008
naes 31jan2009
pew 07nov2010
cces 05nov2012
pew 11nov2012
spae 28nov2012
−.8 −.6 −.4 −.2 0 .2 .4
Party difference in confidence (D − R)
Own vote
Country’s vote
Notes: Plot shows coefficients from linear probability models where the outcome is the probability
of a “very confident” response and the key independent variable is whether the respondent voted
for the Democratic candidate in the most recent national election. Regressions also adjust for
education, income, age, gender, race, and state (or region if state is unavailable). All covariates are
entered as indicators, except age which is entered linearly. Horizontal lines span 95% confidence
intervals constructed from robust standard errors.
Figure 5: Effect of election outcomes on individual-level confidence: difference-in-differences estimates.
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Notes: Estimates shown are difference-in-differences, with standard errors in parentheses (clustering on respondent). The data from
the first panel are from the 2004 NAES (N=548); the data in the second panel are from the 2008 Pew survey for own-vote confidence
(n=586) and the 2008 NAES for country-level confidence (N=7,409); the data from the third panel are from the 2012 CCES (n=1,847).
Figure 6: Voter confidence by voting technology in the 2008 and 2012 elections.
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(b) Country’s vote.
.15
.2
.25
.3
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
ve
ry
 c
on
fid
en
t
Paper
to Paper
Paper
to Electronic
Electronic
to Paper
Electronic
to Electronic
2012
Notes: Points are raw means with vertical bars spanning 95% confidence intervals (1.96 standard
errors of the group means). All data are from the 2008 and 2012 SPAE surveys.
Table 1: Effect of election outcomes on individual-level confidence: regression estimates adjusting
for trust and lagged confidence.
(a) Own vote.
2004 CBS 2004 NAES 2008 Pew 2012 CCES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Voted for winner 0.19 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.30 0.27 0.26
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Trust X X X
Lagged confidence X X X
Observations 745 745 1,327 1,327 554 288 288 578 578 578
SER 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.36 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.47 0.45
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.35 0.23 0.33 0.21 0.23 0.30
(b) Country’s vote.
2000 NAES 2008 NAES 2012 CCES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Voted for winner 0.38 0.39 0.16 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.17
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Trust X X
Lagged confidence X X
Observations 2,966 2,966 7,819 7,819 574 574 574
SER 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.34 0.34 0.33
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.06 0.13 0.27 0.29 0.31
Notes: Cell entries are coefficients from linear probability models where the outcome is the prob-
ability of a “very confident” response and the key independent variable is whether the respondent
voted for the victorious candidate in the most recent national election. Regressions also adjust for
education, income, age, gender, race, and state (or region if state is unavailable). All covariates are
entered as indicators, except age which is entered linearly. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2: Effect of election outcomes on individual-level confidence: regression estimates adjusting
for voting technology.
(a) Own vote.
2008 SPAE 2012 SPAE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voted for winner 0.08 0.08 0.22 0.22
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
DRE Current Year -0.04 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
DRE 2000 -0.12 -0.02
(0.05) (0.04)
DRE 2000 X DRE Current Year 0.07 0.02
(0.05) (0.04)
Observations 9,318 9,318 7,302 7,302
SER 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.46
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.09
(b) Country’s vote.
2012 SPAE
(1) (2)
Voted for winner 0.19 0.19
(0.01) (0.01)
DRE Current Year 0.01
(0.02)
DRE 2000 0.01
(0.03)
DRE 2000 X DRE Current Year -0.00
(0.03)
Observations 7,227 7,227
SER 0.38 0.38
R-squared 0.13 0.13
Notes: Cell entries are coefficients from linear probability models where the outcome is the prob-
ability of a “very confident” response and the key independent variable is whether the respondent
voted for the victorious candidate in the most recent national election. Regressions also adjust for
education, income, age, gender, race, and state (or region if state is unavailable). All covariates are
entered as indicators, except age which is entered linearly. Robust standard errors in parentheses
(clustered at the county level when voting technology is included).
Appendix 1: Data Sources and Question Wordings
Polls used in the analysis
Table A1: Confidence in own vote.
Date House Mode Sample
11/12/2000 CBS / New York Times Telephone Voters
12/16/2000 LA Times Telephone Registered Voters
07/15/2004 CBS / New York Times Telephone Voters
10/19/2004 Pew Telephone Registered Voters
10/26/2004 ABC / Washington Post Telephone Voters
11/01/2004 National Annenberg Election Study Telephone Likely Voters
11/08/2004 Pew Telephone Registered Voters
12/19/2004 ABC Telephone Voters
12/24/2004 National Annenberg Election Study Telephone Voters
10/04/2006 Pew Telephone Registered Voters
10/15/2006 CNN Telephone Registered Voters
10/25/2006 Fox News Telephone Likely Voters
11/04/2006 Pew Telephone Registered Voters
11/04/2006 ABC / Washington Post Telephone Voters
11/12/2006 Pew Telephone Registered Voters
12/02/2007 Gallup / USA Today Telephone Eligible Voters
10/19/2008 Pew Telephone Registered Voters
11/09/2008 Pew Telephone Voters
11/11/2008 Survey of the Performance of American Elections Internet Voters
11/07/2010 Pew Telephone Voters
11/05/2012 CCES Internet Eligible Voters
11/11/2012 Pew Telephone Voters
11/28/2012 Survey of the Performance of American Elections Internet Voters
12/12/2012 CCES Internet Eligible Voters
Table A2: Confidence in country’s vote.
Date House Mode Sample
11/12/2000 Pew Telephone Voters
01/19/2001 National Annenberg Election Study Telephone Registered Voters
10/30/2004 CBS / New York Times Telephone Voters
11/08/2004 Pew Telephone Registered Voters
12/19/2004 ABC Telephone Voters
10/15/2006 CNN Telephone Registered Voters
10/22/2006 Gallup / USA Today Telephone Eligible Voters
11/12/2006 Pew Telephone Voters
12/02/2007 Gallup / USA Today Telephone Eligible Voters
01/01/2008 National Annenberg Election Study Internet Voters
10/29/2008 CBS / New York Times Telephone Registered Voters
11/09/2008 Pew Telephone Voters
01/31/2009 National Annenberg Election Study Internet Voters
11/07/2010 Pew Telephone Voters
11/05/2012 CCES Internet Registered Voters
11/11/2012 Pew Telephone Voters
11/28/2012 Survey of the Performance of American Elections Internet Voters
12/12/2012 CCES Internet Registered Voters
Question wordings
Confidence in own vote
11/12/2000 CBS / New York Times Given the kinds of problems that have been reported in Florida,
how much confidence do you have that your (2000 presidential) vote was counted properly–a lot,
some, not much, or no confidence at all?
12/16/2000 LA Times Do you personally have a lot of confidence that your (2000) vote for
president was counted, or some confidence, or no confidence at all that your vote for president was
counted?
07/15/2004 CBS / New York Times How much confidence do you have that the votes in your
state will be counted properly this November – a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all?
10/19/2004 Pew How confident are you that your vote will be accurately counted in the up-
coming election?
10/26/2004 ABC / Washington Post And how confident are you that your own vote for pres-
ident (in 2004) will be accurately counted this year: very confident, somewhat confident, not too
confident or not confident at all?
11/01/2004 National Annenberg Election Study Are you confident that your vote will be counted
accurately, or are you doubtful?
11/08/2004 Pew How confident are you that your vote was accurately counted?
12/19/2004 ABC How confident are you that your own vote for president (in 2004) was accu-
rately counted this year: very confident, somewhat confident, not-too-confident or not confident at
all?
12/24/2004 National Annenberg Election Study Are you confident that your vote has been
counted accurately, or are you doubtful?
10/04/2006 Pew How confident are you that your vote will be accurately counted in the up-
coming election?
10/15/2006 CNN How confident are you that your vote and the votes cast by people in your
family will be counted accurately in this year’s (2006) election–very confident, somewhat confi-
dent, not too confident, or not confident at all?
10/25/2006 Fox News How confident are you that your vote will be accurately counted in this
year’s (2006) election?
11/04/2006 Pew How confident are you that your vote will be accurately counted in the up-
coming election?
11/04/2006 ABC / Washington Post How confident are you that your own vote in this election
will be accurately counted this year (2006): very confident, somewhat confident, not too confident
or not confident at all?
11/12/2006 Pew How confident are you that your vote was accurately counted?
12/02/2007 Gallup / USA Today Thinking about the general election for president to be held in
November 2008, How confident are you that, at the voting facility where you vote, the votes will
be accurately cast and counted in next year’s election–very confident, somewhat confident, not too
confident, or not at all confident?
10/19/2008 Pew How confident are you that your vote will be accurately counted in the up-
coming election?
11/09/2008 Pew How confident are you that your vote was accurately counted?
11/11/2008 Survey of the Performance of American Elections How confident are you that your
vote in the General Election was counted as you intended?
11/07/2010 Pew How confident are you that your vote was accurately counted?
11/05/2012 YouGov/Polimetrix How confident are you that your vote in the General Election
was counted as you intended?
11/11/2012 Pew How confident are you that your vote was accurately counted?
11/28/2012 Survey of the Performance of American Elections How confident are you that your
vote in the General Election was counted as you intended?
12/12/2012 CCES How confident are you that your vote in the General Election was counted
as you intended?
Confidence in country’s vote
11/12/2000 Pew As you may know, the outcome of this year’s presidential election will be decided
by a very narrow margin in Florida and several other states. All things considered, do you think
we will have an accurate count of the votes in Florida and other close states, or not?
01/19/2001 National Annenberg Election Study Are you confident that the votes in this {through
30 Dec 00: year’s | starting 2 Jan 01: past} presidential election {through 12 Dec 00: are being |
starting 13 Dec 00: have been} counted fairly, or don’t you feel this way? Q410 (Yes or No)
10/30/2004 CBS / New York Times How much confidence do you have that the votes for
president will be counted properly this November (2004)–a lot, some, not much, or no confidence
at all?
11/08/2004 Pew How confident are you that the votes across the country were accurately
counted?
12/19/2004 ABC On another subject, how confident are you that the votes for president across
the country were accurately counted this year?
10/15/2006 CNN How confident are you that, across the country, the votes will be accurately
counted in this years election – very confident, somewhat confident, not too confident, or not
confident at all?
10/22/2006 Gallup / USA Today How confident are you that, across the country, the votes will
be accurately cast and counted in this year’s election?
11/12/2006 Pew How confident are you that the votes across the country were accurately
counted?
12/02/2007 Gallup / USA Today How confident are you that, across the country, the votes will
be accurately cast and counted in next year’s election
01/01/2008 National Annenberg Election Study When Election Day comes, how confident are
you that the votes across the country will be accurately counted?
10/29/2008 CBS / New York Times How much confidence do you have that the votes for
president will be counted properly this November (2008)–a lot, some, not much, or no confidence
at all?
11/09/2008 Pew How confident are you that the votes across the country were accurately
counted?
01/31/2009 National Annenberg Election Study How confident are you that the votes across
the country were accurately counted on Election Day?
11/07/2010 Pew How confident are you that the votes across the country were accurately
counted?
11/05/2012 YouGov/Polimetrix Think about vote counting throughout your county or city, and
not just your own personal situation. How confident are you that votes in your county or city were
counted as voters intended?
11/11/2012 Pew How confident are you that the votes across the country were accurately
counted?
11/28/2012 Survey of the Performance of American Elections Think about vote counting through-
out your county or city, and not just your own personal situation. How confident are you that votes
in your county or city were counted as voters intended?
12/12/2012 CCES Think about vote counting throughout your county or city, and not just your
own personal situation. How confident are you that votes in your county or city were counted as
voters intended?
Appendix 2: Additional Specifications
Figure A1: Replication of Figure 3 using alternative election samples.
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Figure A2: Replication of Figure 4 using Probit regressions.
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